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I.   MEDICAID: AN AMERICAN SUCCESS STORY
Medicaid was established in 1965 as a jointly funded federal-state pro-
gram to provide medical assistance to low-income Americans.1 Each state
is responsible for designing and administering its own Medicaid program,
subject to certain federal requirements involving issues such as eligibility,
level of service provided, and health care provider payments.2 The federal
government pays a portion of whatever qualifying expenditures a state
Medicaid program incurs, and the states have the option of providing any
additional services.3
For the past thirty years, the Medicaid program has been the lifeblood
of the United States’ health and long-term care delivery system for mil-
lions of Americans. Indeed, over thirty-six million Americans received
Medicaid benefits in 1995.4 Medicaid is the only source of medical cover-
age for many Americans with diverse health care needs. It provides a
medical safety net for pregnant women and children, the elderly, and dis-
abled Americans. The program provides preventive care for low-income
and moderate-income pregnant women and children, and it provides long-
term care for the elderly and persons with disabilities.5
Through a federal-state government partnership, Medicaid provides
acute-care and preventive care coverage that is similar to the employer-
                                                                                                         
* Senior U.S. Senator from Florida. B.A., 1959, University of Florida; J.D., 1962,
Harvard University. This Article was adapted by Charles R. Fletcher, Articles Editor, from a
series of speeches given by Senator Graham.
1. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK 1 (1993)
[hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK].
2. Id. The only state without a formal Medicaid program is Arizona, but since 1982,
Arizona has been receiving federal funds through a Medicaid waiver program. Id.
3. Id.
4. Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, Statement
Before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergov-
ernmental Relations, Jan. 18, 1996, available in Federal Document Clearing House.
5. Id. at 2.
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based coverage available to other Americans.6 Additionally, Medicaid
provides to senior citizens and disabled Americans long-term care rarely
available through any other source.7 This long-term care has also been a
lifeline for America’s fragile elderly. Over sixty percent of the nursing
home residents in this country qualify for Medicaid,8 many qualifying
only after their life savings have been depleted by chronic medical condi-
tions.9 Great strides have been made in improving the quality of care for
our elderly who depend upon Medicaid for their survival. For the senior
citizens of our nation, Medicaid has been a tremendous success.
Medicaid also successfully provides for the needs of other segments of
America. For example, the Qualified Medicaid Beneficiary program, cov-
ers Medicaid premiums, deductibles, and co-payments for beneficiaries
who have incomes below the federal poverty level.10 Nearly seventeen
million low-income Americans participate in this program.11 This program
has made the difference between preventive care in a doctor’s office and
intensive care in a hospital emergency room. The many families whose
lives have been bettered through the Medicaid program all have their own
stories to tell.12 These families could have been your family, my family,
or any other American family.
                                                                                                         
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 811.
9. Id. at 841.
10. See generally U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: EFFORTS TO
ENHANCE PATIENT QUALITY OF CARE (1994).
11. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 11, 13-15.
12. Many of these stories are profiles in courage—the courage of families trying to deal
with health setbacks and scarce resources. For instance, Yvette Elkins, of Columbus, Ohio,
[a]fter giving birth to her first child[,] stopped working to stay home with her baby.
Shortly after she resigned, she learned that she was pregnant again. Soon after, her
husband left her and the baby. For the first time in her life, Yvette began receiving
welfare. Two weeks after her second child was born, Yvette began interviewing for
full-time jobs. She depended on Medicaid to bridge the gap between homelessness
and gainful employment. Medicaid paid for prescription drugs, doctor visits, and
emergency visits; all critical services since Yvette’s younger child suffered from
chronic ear infections. Transitional Medicaid allowed Yvette to catch up on back
bills and advance far enough to obtain a job that offers benefits.
141 CONG. REC. S16,645 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1995). Another example is the story of Donna
Guyton of Nashville, Tennessee:
A mosquito bite is irritating, but hardly ever life-threatening. After a fateful family
vacation to Michigan in 1990, Donna’s son, Patrick, contracted viral encephalitis,
possibly from a mosquito bite. He was hospitalized for three and a half months and
suffered from severe seizures. He eventually had to be placed in a drug-induced
coma. Until September of 1991, he was covered under his father’s medical insur-
ance. Then his father’s company was bought out, and when they re-enlisted in the
plan, Patrick was not covered. Patrick was covered by COBRA for 29 months and in
November 1992, he was enrolled in the Medicaid Model Waiver Program at
Vanderbilt HMO so that he could receive care from the specialists he needed. But
Vanderbilt’s Medical director consistently denied the care that the specialists re-
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We cannot turn our backs on older Americans who have given so
much to our country. We cannot eliminate preventive care for low-income
women and their children. Nor can we retreat from the gains we have
made in providing a decent quality of life for developmentally disabled
Americans.
Not long ago, when the consensus emerged from across the country to
stop warehousing the handicapped in shamefully large institutions, the
goal was to get as many people as possible out of institutions and into
community-based home settings.13 The federal-state Medicaid partnership
became the framework for change. The Medicaid framework was flexible
and able to act as quickly as the states desired. That flexibility is the
beauty of the Medicaid federal-state partnership. Some states moved
quickly, but unfortunately some did not. However, the results speak for
themselves: in 1967 there were over 194,000 mentally retarded or devel-
opmentally disabled Americans living in state institutions; in 1990, there
were only 86,219.14
Furthermore, this incredible effort to deinstitutionalize the handi-
capped and enable them to lead more independent lives has actually re-
duced the cost of care. While an institutional bed can cost as much as
$92,000,15 the cost, on average, is $22,000 for a “home waiver” bed
where a disabled American can receive needed care in his or her own
home.16 Although these numbers provide some sense of the savings Medi-
caid has achieved through deinstitutionalization, more impressive is the
number of people whose families stayed together—at home—because of
Medicaid. Today, some six million disabled Americans are covered under
Medicaid.17 There is a compelling national interest in assuring a humane
quality of life for the disabled and infirm.
To tout Medicaid’s successes is not to ignore its faults. There is work
to be done to improve accountability, combat fraud and waste, and check
growth in spending. However, the current proposals to give block grants
to the states and dismantle this American success story by eliminating the
federal-state partnership would destroy the flexible institutional frame-
                                                                                                         
quested. As a result of the poor attention and insufficient medication, Patrick . . .
has had other health and emotional problems.
141 CONG. REC. S16,646-47 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1995).
13. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 862, 869.
14. Id. at 870.
15. New Medicaid Caps Set off Alarm for Disabled Care, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE
TELE., Aug. 21, 1995, at D1 (“In the costliest of cases, institutionalizing a severely mentally
retarded person . . . can cost $92,000 a year; $72,000 in a group home or private apartment;
or $25,000 a year at home with a family.”).
16. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 909, 902.
17. Diane Rowland, Executive Director of the Kaiser Commission on the Future of
Medicaid, Statement Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Commerce,
Mar. 6, 1996, available in Federal Document Clearing House.
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work that has been so successful.18 Furthermore, the proposed block grant
funding formula actually rewards states that have taken advantage of flaws
in the existing Medicaid program. Part II of this Article discusses the
failures of the block grant proposal. Part III describes how we can achieve
these goals without discarding the federal-state partnership that has served
the people of our nation so well during the past thirty years and how we
can continue to provide a medical safety net for poor, elderly, and dis-
abled Americans.
                                                                                                         
18. The Republican Congressional leadership proposed as part of the 1996 budget rec-
onciliation bill a Medicaid reform package that would have replaced the existing federal-state
Medicaid partnership with a new block-grant program that did not provide meaningful federal
guarantees of eligibility or benefits. Donna Shalala, Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, June 13, 1996, avail-
able in Federal Document Clearing House.
The block grant program was designed to allocate to each state Medicaid program one lump
sum per year. Each state could then do with the money what it wished, with few limitations.
This achieved two goals of the Republican Congressional Majority: 1) it vested decision-
making authority in the state agencies, and 2) it set a fixed limit on federal Medicaid expendi-
tures by changing Medicaid from a per person benefit to an annual grant. See id.
One of the Clinton Administration’s fundamental problems with the block-grant proposal was
that it ended the Federal government’s commitment to the states to bear part of the burden of
changes in demand on state Medicaid programs and left states with the full financial respon-
sibility for providing health care to individuals who would qualify for services in the future due
to unanticipated enrollment increases or economic downturns. Id. The Congress passed the
block grant proposal as part of a 1996 budget package, but President Clinton vetoed the
budget, due in part to his opposition to the Medicaid block-grant program.
In February 1996, the National Governors’ Association (NGA) approved the outlines of a
bipartisan Medicaid reform plan. This bipartisan effort rejected block grants and adopted ele-
ments of the per capita cap approach to Medicaid that I proposed last year and that is discussed
in part III of this Article. The NGA proposal held some promise to be a real basis for Medi-
caid reform. However, the Republican majority in both houses of Congress introduced a re-
vised version of their Medicaid bill, a version that is much more similar to the legislation
which President Clinton vetoed last year than is the bipartisan reform envisioned by the gover-
nors. Id. at 3.
[The Republicans’] Medicaid proposal is far from the NGA agreement and appears to be
more like the proposal vetoed by the President last year and rejected by the Governors at
our winter meeting .... [A]ccording to our early calculations, 96 percent of the funding un-
der this new formula is distributed precisely in the same manner as your earlier bills pro-
posed. You have created a block grant for this program with essentially the same language
and parameters of the vetoed bill—a block grant that denies a safety net for our most vul-
nerable citizens.
Id. (quoting a May 29, 1996 letter from four Governors to Senator William Roth, Chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee).
As of the writing of this Article, Congressional Republicans and the Clinton Administration
have not reached an agreement on Medicaid reform. See id. While the level of the budget cuts
and other details of the Republican proposal may change, it remains substantially the same
proposal Congress passed last fall—the proposal that President Clinton vetoed. See id. Conse-
quently, if Congress passes the current Republican proposal, it could very well be vetoed
again.
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II.   MEDICAID BLOCK GRANTS: MISGUIDED MEDICAID REFORM
Now Medicaid is under attack. It is hard to understand the justification
for the $72 billion that the Republicans wanted to cut from the projected
needs of the program.19 There are those who point to the increase in the
Medicaid program and then blindly conclude that the program is bloated and
inefficient, with money spent haphazardly at best. However, a thorough ex-
amination of the Medicaid program—why it has grown, how it has grown,
why it is expected to grow—will lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
U.S. Congress cannot cut $72 billion in funds in Medicaid without having in-
fants dying, the elderly neglected, and the disabled unnecessarily institutional-
ized.20
Take the projected needs of the Medicaid program through the year
2002—$899 billion21—and then subtract the amount of the proposed cuts—
$72 billion. The amount of money is that is left—$827 billion—is now go-
ing to pay for $899 billion in projected needs. That simple math illustrates
that the proposed block grants will come up short.
A.   Abuse of the Disproportionate Share Hospital Program
An amendment to the first Budget Reconciliation Act of 1996 gave $10.2
billion22 largely to those states that were the primary abusers of Medicaid
disproportionate share hospital funds in the past.23 In effect, Congress re-
warded the very states that manipulated the Medicaid system and abused the
Medicaid disproportionate share hospital program (DSH). The intent of
                                                                                                         
19. The Congressional Budget Office projects that a 10% annual increase in Medicaid spending
over the next seven years is necessary to maintain existing services levels. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006 74 (May 1996)
[hereinafter BUDGET OUTLOOK: 1997-2006]. The Republican leadership during the first session of
the 104th Congress proposed funding Medicaid at a level $182 million below the projected needs over
seven years. Christina Kent, Threatened by Reform?, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 23, 1995, at 1. This
proposed cut would have reduced annual growth from the current rate of 10% per annum to about
2%. Christina Kent, Radical Medicaid Plans Shift Power to States, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 9, 1995,
at 1. After negotiations, the Congress passed a budget that cut Medicaid by $176 billion, approxi-
mately 17% less that the projected need. Christina Kent, AMA Promotes State Feasibility on Medi-
caid-With Safety Net, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 18, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Kent, State Feasibility].
President Clinton vetoed this budget. Id. In the second session of the 104th Congress, Republicans
proposed $72 billion in cuts over 6 years and, as of the writing of this Article, this proposal is still
under debate.
20. Expressing his concerns about pending Medicaid reforms to a group of public health
officials, former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, M.D., said he had “never seen such dis-
couragement among health care professionals.” Surgeon General Koop later concluded that
“most of the reform plans have more to do with political posturing and very little to do with
what is best for the health of the American people.” Deborah L. Shelton, Public Health Fears
Threat from Declining Funds, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 20, 1995, at 6.
21. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET
PROPOSAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 45 (Apr. 1995); Telephone Interview with Nani Coloretti,
Office of Management and Budget (July 10, 1996) [Coloretti Interview].
22. See S. 1357, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2121, 2122, 7014 (1995).
23. See infra notes 33-50.
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DSH payments, instituted by legislation, was to assist hospitals that treat
great numbers of Medicaid and low-income, uninsured patients with special
needs.24 Recognizing that these hospitals would have a small privately insured
patient base, Congress intended these “disproportionate share” hospitals
to have their Medicaid payments supplemented.25
In fiscal year 1989, federal funding for Medicaid DSH payments was
just $569 million.26 However, in coming up with their shares of those
funds, some states began to see the potential in the use of donations and
provider tax revenue as the state shares of Medicaid expenditures.27 Pro-
vider taxes and donations allowed states to increase federal Medicaid
funds while backing out of providing their states’ matching shares and
sometimes effectively pocketing the federal share of money meant for
disproportionate share hospitals.28 What was created with good intentions
was creatively abused by states across the nation.29
The abuse was so great that between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year
1992, federal spending for Medicaid disproportionate share hospital pay-
ments grew from $400 million to $16.5 billion, more than a 4000 percent
increase.30 In states such as Michigan, Texas, and Tennessee, Medicaid
DSH payments actually exceeded regular Medicaid payments for inpatient
hospital services.31 This rapid growth—a 4000 percent increase in just
four years—was a tremendous reason for Medicaid’s overall spending
growth during the period from 1989 to 1993. The Kaiser Commission on
the Future of Medicaid estimated that over one-half the annual increase in
Medicaid between 1991 and 1992 was due to increases in DSH payments
concentrated in about fifteen states.32 By 1994, DSH payments accounted
for twelve percent of total Medicaid spending.33
                                                                                                         
24. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 319.
25. Id. at 319-320.
26. Id. at 321.
27. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: STATES USE ILLUSORY AP-
PROACHES TO SHIFT PROGRAM COSTS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (1994) [hereinafter
ILLUSORY APPROACHES].
28. Id. at 1.
29. According to the General Accounting Office, Michigan, Tennessee, and Texas are
among the worst abusers of the DSH program. Id.
30. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 322.
31. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID SPECIAL
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS: DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITALS (DSH) PAYMENTS,
PROVIDER TAXES, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS 3 (1995) [hereinafter KAISER
COMMISSION]; ILLUSORY APPROACHES, supra note 27, at 5, 10.
32. Rowland, supra note 17, at 4.
33. Telephone Interview with the Health Cost Estimates Unit, Congressional Budget Of-
fice (July 10, 1996).
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B.   The DSH and Provider Donations “Scam”: How It Happened
Until 1985, Medicaid rules did not specifically allow the use of do-
nated funds for any purpose other than training.34 At that time, the Health
Care Financing Administration35 viewed the uses of donated funds for
other purposes as a potential opportunity for misuse as a “kickback” by
organizations such as long-term-care facilities or data-processing compa-
nies that receive Medicaid business.36 However, by 1985, the Health Care
Financing Administration had concluded that the potential for abuse was
minimal, and a new regulation was promulgated allowing the use of do-
nated funds for virtually any purpose, provided certain conditions were
met.37
Soon states developed programs to use donated funds to finance the
states’ shares of Medicaid spending.38 States found very creative ways to
increase their state contributions and, thereby, the federal matches. In the
case of Pennsylvania,
1170 hospitals got together, formed a foundation [and] borrowed some
$365 million from a lending institution. They donated the money to the
State treasury. The Federal match for Pennsylvania is such that the State
got $380 million to match the $365 million they put up. The $365 million
that was put up by this group of 170 hospitals went to the 170 hospitals as
increased disproportional share payments, so they were made completely
whole including the cost of borrowing the money. . . . The $380 mil-
lion that the Feds put in, the only new money in the system, went to
some 260 hospitals in the state . . . to increase rates to hospitals . . . .39
The General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that states often churned or
even laundered federal Medicaid dollars through state hospitals. The GAO
found that
financing mechanisms used [by high-DSH states]. . . effectively in-
creased the federal percentage share of Medicaid medical assistance
payments . . . . Although Medicaid payments were made in accordance
with the federal medical assistance percentage rates, as established by
law, our analysis shows that the federal dollars account for a greater
share of Medicaid expenditures than ultimately benefitted providers in
these states. The financial arrangements we have highlighted resulted in
                                                                                                         
34. 42 C.F.R. § 432.69 (1985); MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 500.
35. The Health Care Financing Administration is the agency within the Department of
Heath and Human Services that administers federal Medicaid spending and oversees state
Medicaid programs. See Vladeck, supra note 4, at 2.
36. Id.
37. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 500 (42 C.F.R. § 433.45(b) (1986) listed
two conditions regulating the use of donated funds: 1) the funds had to be transferred to the
Medicaid agency and be under its administrative control, and 2) the funds could not revert to
the donor unless the donor was a nonprofit organization.).
38. Id. at 501.
39. Id. at 502.
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providers only receiving a net benefit from Medicaid payments because
they either returned the payments to the state treasury or directed the
payments for use in non-Medicaid programs. . . .40
Based on evaluations of the DSH program, the Health Care Financing
Administration warns that
state donation and tax programs . . . have the potential to undermine
the basic premise of the Medicaid program—that funding be shared
through a Federal Match of state monies. In a matching program, those
responsible for expenditure decisions and the direct fiscal management
of the program must have a reasonable stake in the costs. This shared
responsibility works to shape their decisionmaking to contain costs.41
As a result of these scams, Congress enacted legislation to create
state-specific ceiling limits on each state’s spending for DSH-payment
adjustments to twelve percent of the state’s total Medicaid spending for
the year.42 This limit, combined with other changes in the amount of
money a single hospital can receive and the definition of what constitutes
a provider tax, has been effective at controlling these costs. In fact, at
least eighteen states that have twelve percent of their overall Medicaid
spending in DSH payments are capped at the absolute dollars they re-
ceived in 1993.43
C.   Republican Budget Plan
Congress is prepared to abandon the successful aspects of the Medicaid
program and reward those who abused the Medicaid program in the past.
Last fall, this was done in an amendment that decreased the federal re-
duction in Medicaid payments to states from $187 billion to $176 bil-
lion.44
Some of the winners and losers are well known by now. In the Senate
proposal, approximately $11.2 billion in additional Medicaid dollars
would have been distributed over the next seven years to states with two
Republican Senators, while states with two Democratic Senators would
have lost an additional $3.6 billion.45 Less well known is the fact that
states that have had excessive Medicaid disproportionate share programs
                                                                                                         
40. ILLUSORY APPROACHES, supra note 27, at 12.
41. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 501.
42. Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendment of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-234, 102 Stat. 234 (1991); see MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at
500, 511.
43. KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 31, at 2; MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at
503-113.
44. See S. 1357, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2121 (1995) (amended by S. Amd. 3028).
45. Studies in Brief: States Like New Hampshire and Louisiana, INSIDE HEALTH CARE
REFORM 1 (June 1, 1995). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that the Senate
bill would “lock in the historical spending patterns among states.” Id.; see S. 1357, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2121 (1995) (amended by S. Amd. 3028).
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in the past would have also been big winners. New Hampshire and Lou-
isiana, the most notorious examples of excess, had special fixes in the
Senate bill to excuse those two states from fully matching the federal
funding they would have received during the next few years.46
Meanwhile, nine other states,47 all of which have disproportionate
share programs that far exceed the national average and some of which
have schemed against the federal treasury in the past, would have re-
ceived $14.8 billion in increased Medicaid funding during the next seven
years as a result of the Republican leadership Medicaid plan.48 Current
law caps these “high-DSH” states’ programs.49 However, the Republican
deal would have allowed these states to keep and make permanent all of
those dollars by including these funds in the states’ base allotments and
would have allowed them to increase that money annually from this year
forward. Thus, it provided a $14.8 billion windfall for nine “high-DSH”
states.50 The rest of the nation’s states—mostly “low-DSH” states—would
have lost another $3.6 billion from an amendment that added an additional
$10.2 billion back to the Medicaid program.51
D.   Social Security Trust Fund Raid
The Senate planned to pay for these supplemental Medicaid allocations
by mandating a 2.6% Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) for 1996. Un-
der the Roth amendment, this money was “found” when the Senate de-
clared that the cost-of-living adjustment for 1996 would be 2.6%, which
was lower than the 3.1% projected when the budget bills began moving
through Congress last spring.52 The result of the lower COLA, said pro-
ponents, would be lower outlays for programs tied to the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), such as Social Security.53 At first glance, this sounds great—
let’s recognize the economic reality that COLAs will be lower next year
than anticipated. Upon closer inspection, however, the logic fails and it
becomes clear that the funding was either phony or, more likely, a raid on
the Social Security Trust Fund.
                                                                                                         
46. Studies in Brief, supra note 45. While this budget package was vetoed by President
Clinton, see supra note 18, similar fixes were part of the Omnibus Consolidated Recision and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 96-10, § 519 (1996), which was subsequently en-
acted as a compromise budget.
47. Alabama, Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina,
Tennessee and Texas. KAISER COMMISSION, supra note 31, at 11.
48. 141 CONG. REC. S16,808 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1995).
49. The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendment of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-234, 102 Stat. 234 (1991); see MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1,
at 321-22.
50. 141 CONG. REC. S16,808 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1995).
51. Id.
52. See S. 1357, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7481 (1995) (amended by S. Amd. 3028).
53. Id.
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In order to understand this, a brief explanation of how the budget is
scored is in order. In April, 1995, the Congress established an economic
baseline.54 This baseline forecasts the level of federal revenues and ex-
penditures for the next seven years and is grounded on current law and
current and projected economic data.55 In making these economic projec-
tions, the Congressional Budget Office makes assumptions regarding a
number of factors.56 Some of the factors include inflation, interest rates,
gross domestic product (GDP), and revenues.57 From that baseline, the
Congressional Budget Office can estimate the impact that changes in law
will have on federal revenues or expenditures.58
Since the economic baseline was established, some of the assumptions
have turned out to be high and others low. For example, at the end of
1995, inflation was lower than expected, gross domestic product was
slightly higher than expected and interest rates were higher than pro-
jected.59 While it is true that the fact that the 1996 COLA will be 2.6%
rather than 3.1% will result in $13 billion in lower outlays, this will be
more than offset by other factors (e.g., higher interest rates) that increase
outlays or decrease revenues.60 Thus, the Senate’s financing of the addi-
tional Medicaid funds is phony.
So where does this money come from? Let’s look at the language of
the Roth amendment:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of any program
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Finance of the United
States Senate which is adjusted for any increase in the consumer price
index for all urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W) for the
United States city average for all items, any such adjustment which
takes effect during fiscal year 1996 shall be equal to 2.6 percent.61
This clearly specifies that the money would come from programs, or out-
lays—not Department of Defense outlays, or funding for roads and
bridges, or foreign aid, which are not in the jurisdiction of the Finance
Committee. The overwhelming majority of the outlays within the juris-
diction of the Finance Committee—an amount totaling $12 of the $13 bil-
lion—is for Social Security.62 So the only conclusion is that the Senate
                                                                                                         
54. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE
45 (1995) [hereinafter BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE].
55. Id.
56. Id at 13.
57. Id. at 14, 58-59.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 15.
60. Id.
61. See S. 1357, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7481 (1995) (amended by S. Amd. 3028).
62. 141 CONG. REC. S16,808 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1995).
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took $12 billion from the Social Security Trust Fund to pay for more
Medicaid allocations.63
How can a 0.5% reduction in the CPI constitute a raid on the Social
Security Trust Fund? The Roth amendment took into account only outlays
impacted by the lower 2.6% COLA. But there are other ramifications of a
lower COLA. For example, many workers’ salaries are tied to the CPI.
And if those salaries rise by only 2.6% rather than 3.1%, then payroll
taxes will be lower and, consequently, less money will flow into the So-
cial Security Trust Fund than would have occurred if the COLA had been
3.1%.
The correct question is not how a lower COLA will impact Social Se-
curity outlays. The proper question is what the net effect of all of the eco-
nomic changes this year would have been to the Social Security Trust
Fund. The answer has two components: outlays and revenues. The Social
Security outlays would have been reduced by a total of $18 billion—$12
billion from the COLA reduction to 2.6% and $6 billion from other
changes.64 However, the economic data accumulated since March, 1995
also will affect revenues and, according to the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, updating the economic baseline will result in a $62 billion dollar de-
crease in Social Security Trust Fund revenues during the next seven
years.65 Accordingly, the net effect of revising Congressional economic
estimates to the Social Security Trust Fund is a decrease of $44 billion.66
So, if we want to face economic reality, the Social Security Trust Fund
would have $44 billion less in it than our budget assumed. And, while the
Social Security Trust Fund is losing $44 billion as a result of economic
changes since March, 1995, the Senate approved diverting an additional
$12 billion from the Trust Fund.
 The Republicans cannot have it both ways. If the proposed reduction
in the COLA was not a real cut in spending but merely reflected reality,
then it did not represent savings and should not qualify to offset real, new
Medicaid spending. If, however, the proposed reduction in the COLA
                                                                                                         
63. See Thomas Daschle, Democrats Offer Amendments To Get Budget Negotiations
Moving, Correct Worst Problems in Reconciliation Bill, Nov. 2, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, File No. 11630810. Senator Daschle called the Roth amendment a “illegal use of
nearly $12 billion in COLA funds as offsets to buy Republican votes for reconciliation.” Id at
2. This shifting of funds can legitimately be characterized as illegal because the Congressional
Budget Act prohibits the use of funds not included in the budget (Social Security) to pay for
budget expenses (Medicaid). Id; see 2 U.S.C. § 641(d), (g) (1995). Medicaid is included in the
general budget, while Social Security is funded separately through the Social Security Trust
Fund. See Daschle, supra, at 2.
64. Daschle, supra note 63, at 2.
65. BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE, supra note 54, at 22.
66. Id.
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was real, then it constituted a diversion of funds from the Social Security
Trust Fund.67
Currently, Congress is considering a Republican Medicaid reform pro-
posal that is substantially the same as that passed and vetoed in the first
session of Congress. Congress should not enact this block grant proposal,
but rather should look for an alternative allocation solution.
III.   MEDICAID REFORM TO SAVE AMERICA’S MEDICAL SAFETY NET
The only way to reform Medicaid is to restrain growing costs without
jeopardizing the successful aspects of Medicaid. The Senate is not irrevoca-
bly wedded to block grants; there is a better way. The foundation of the
block grant proposal—enhanced flexibility for the states—is built on shaky
ground, eroding every day. Shaky, that is, unless you define “flexibility”
as the freedom to raise state taxes or local property taxes, or the flexibil-
ity to pit the elderly against child beneficiaries. Otherwise, there is scant
flexibility the states can receive that they cannot already get under the
waiver program.68 The Department of Health and Human Services has
pioneered with willing states extraordinary demonstration projects, where
statutory and regulatory requirements can be waived to permit new ap-
proaches to health care.
In November 1995, I met with Mr. Bruce Vladeck, Administrator of
the Health Care Financing Administration. My question to him was a
simple one: what flexibility to allow innovation would the block grants
give states that they cannot get today through the waiver program. His an-
swer: precious little.69 And what do the states give up in exchange for this
marginal new flexibility? The answers include: 1) the federal partnership
to assist them if they experience caseload growth; 2) the federal partner-
ship during times of economic hardship or recession; and 3) the federal
partnership when there is a natural disaster.70
                                                                                                         
67. As discussed earlier, using saving from an off-budget program, such as Social Secu-
rity, to fund an on-budget program, such as Medicaid, is a violation of Congressional budget
rules. Daschle, supra note 63, at 2; see 2 U.S.C. § 641(d), (g) (1995).
68. As states have felt the pressures of rising Medicaid costs, they have looked for alterna-
tive strategies for providing adequate health care while limiting costs. In order to facilitate more
effective methods of providing Medicaid services, states have had to deviate from the traditional
Medicaid structure. David Parrelle, Statement Before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, Jan. 18, 1996, available in Federal Document
Clearing House. One way that the federal government satisfied this need for flexibility is through
waiver programs such as the section 1115 research and demonstration waiver. Id. This waiver al-
lows a state to set up an experimental health care delivery program and determine whether it will
meet the needs of the state. Id. at 4. Even though waiver programs are designed to provide flexi-
bility, the Health Care Finance Administration reviews the waiver to ensure it meets certain crite-
ria. Id. at 5.
69. 141 CONG. REC. S16,847 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995).
70. Id.
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When Hurricane Andrew hit Miami, Florida’s Medicaid caseload shot
up by 12,000 people.71 Under block grants, a state that is knocked to its
knees by a flood, a riot, an earthquake, or a hurricane, would not find a
helping hand from the federal government at a time it needed help getting
back onto its feet.
So if block grants are this bad, is the only alternative “business as
usual” in Medicaid? No; there is a way to have the best of both worlds—
to contain costs while maintaining the federal-state partnership. The best
of both worlds is the “per capita cap” proposal that is gaining momentum
as the “win-win” answer to the block grant’s “lose-lose” proposition. The
per capita cap approach provides that health care and coverage can be
protected and costs controlled by disciplining the program with an annual
limit in federal spending per beneficiary.
This approach maintains the individual guarantee to Medicaid coverage
and creates incentives for states to maintain health care coverage. Funding
would follow the patient, not some bureaucratic entity. The per capita cap
approach that I presented to the Senate in November 1995 saves $62 bil-
lion over the next seven years.72 It enhances state flexibility and reduces
the rate of growth in federal Medicaid spending to a level that is sustain-
able for the states, the beneficiaries, and the federal government. It as-
sures that states with innovative demonstrations already underway can
continue to operate their programs and that other states wishing to inno-
vate have the resources and ability to do so.
Let me briefly outline how the per capita cap approach would work.
Federal funding would be allocated to states on a per person-in-need ba-
sis. If, hypothetically, it costs $1000 to provide Medicaid benefits to a
person in California, the federal government would allocate its share of
money, or $500 in this case, for each person who qualifies for Medicaid
in the state. If needs increase because of population shifts, recession,
natural disaster, or public health calamity and more people become eligi-
ble for coverage, the federal partnership and contribution of $500 per per-
son would be guaranteed—not as under a block grant where a fixed sum is
allocated regardless of circumstance. The incentive is to reduce costs and
not cut people off coverage because if states arbitrarily cut people off,
they lose the federal match. Costs are what must be controlled. If, for ex-
ample, California were to spend more than $1000 per person cap, Cali-
                                                                                                         
71. Robert Reischauer, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Feb.
29, 1996, available in Federal Document Clearing House.
72. This per capita cap proposal, which I proposed in November 1995, 141 CONG. REC.
S16,845-48 (Nov. 9 1995), is quite similar to the proposal President Clinton announced in De-
cember 1995. Medicaid Per-Capita Cap Locks in State Disparities, WASH. HEALTH WK.,
Dec. 18, 1995, at 1; see BUDGET OUTLOOK: 1997-2007, supra note 19, at 61. The President’s
per capita cap proposal is estimated to save $54 billion over six years. Rowland, supra note
17, at 4. The National Association of Governors adopted a Medicaid budget proposal that in-
cludes a variation on the per capita cap approach. Coloretti Interview, supra note 21.
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fornia would make up that difference. Again, under a per capita cap, the
money follows the need and person. As a result, during economic booms,
or when health needs decline, the federal government would share in the
savings—also not as under the block grant system that obligates money
regardless of the needs of the residents of the state or the payments made
by the state.
The cap would be stated in inflation terms on an annual basis in order
to protect states from potential inflation increases. The cap would be cu-
mulative and thus allow states enough flexibility to apply savings under
the cap from one year to the next. Caps would be applied separately to the
elderly, the disabled, children, and their mothers. This separation into
four distinct groups avoids the sinister “zero sum game” that is endemic
to block grants—a game in which one group’s interests are pitted against
the others’.
This formula may appear complicated, but it really is a clone of the
way states allocate and distribute school dollars to the districts.73 In fact,
with only four categories to consider, it is far simpler than most “per
pupil” school district formulas.74 The per capita cap idea is also one that
should be familiar to many of my Republican colleagues. It is a concept
that was supported in health proposals introduced by Senators Dole,
Gramm, and Chafee in 1994.75
The Medicaid per capita cap approach permits the states to move to-
ward managed care and other types of arrangements that save money
without needing federal waivers.76 Another advantage to the per capita cap
approach is that many other detailed rules and process-oriented require-
ments would be phased out. States would be held accountable for per-
formance outcomes with respect to certain quality and access measures.77
The federal government would be interested in the outcomes of state
health and long-term care delivery systems but would not be mandating
how to achieve those outcomes.
Finally, the per capita cap approach would cap and retarget future
growth in the DSH program. The per capita cap approach would assure
that children, low-income women, and disabled and elderly Americans
would have continued coverage for hospital, physicians, and nursing
home care services. This approach would cut costs, not people.
                                                                                                         
73. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 361.081 (1995).
74. Id.
75. See Chafee Drops Medicaid Bill; HMOs Weary of Block Grants, INSIDE HEALTH
CARE REFORM, June 1, 1995, at 1; Chafee Medicaid Reform Alternative to Block Grants
Evolving in Senate, INSIDE HEALTH CARE REFORM, June 15, 1995, at 1.
76. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: RESTRUCTURING APPROACHES
LEAVE MANY QUESTIONS 6 (Apr. 1995). This provides great flexibility for states to alter state
Medicaid programs to adapt to the changing needs of beneficiaries without having to go
through the arduous Medicaid waiver process for each program modification.
77. Per capita caps “put states at full risk for the management of the program.” Id.
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IV.   CONCLUSION
The $62 billion reduction in spending achieved through the per capita
cap approach amounts to a surgical cut, not the meat-ax approach of the
$72 billion cut under the block grant legislation that passed the Senate in
1995.78 Further, the per capita cap approach would continue the fed-
eral-state partnership in detecting fraud and punishing defrauders. Medi-
caid fraud, DSH abuse, and unconstrained spending amount to a cancer on
our nation’s health and long-term care delivery system. However, it is a
treatable, not terminal, condition. In our zeal to cure this affliction, let’s
not kill the patient in the process. Let’s not kill the very federal-state
partnership that has served this nation so well for thirty years. After all,
behind the $72 billion in cuts are human beings who will pay the price for
our haste.
In addressing the Medicaid and welfare block grant debates, David
Broder of the Washington Post wrote eloquently of the fear that under
block grants, “the states will engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ that shreds
the social safety net.”79 He predicted the likeliest scenario under block
grants as follows: “What would happen when federal funding is reduced
and federal standards are eliminated is that the 50 legislatures would be-
come the arena, each year, in which the welfare population would have to
compete against other claimants for scarce dollars.”80
I share his bleak view of the future in America under block grants.
You cannot have a race to the bottom without casualties along the way.
Along the way in the block grant “race to the bottom” will be eyeglasses
for the elderly and unfilled prescriptions formerly covered under Medi-
caid. Such benefits will not survive the race to the bottom, and the indi-
vidual losses will be great and even overwhelming. Along the way in the
block grant “race to the bottom” will be families torn apart by unneces-
sary nursing home placements and institutionalization. Home health care
and other Medicaid waiver services will not survive the race to the bot-
tom. Along the way in the block grant “race to the bottom” will be ugly
legislative sessions in fifty state legislatures, where, among the conflicts,
the elderly will be pitted against children and the mentally retarded
against AIDS sufferers in a battle royal for the block-grant dollar.
Is that what we want for America? The race to the bottom has yet to
begin, and it need never begin. There is another way. Per capita cap legis-
lation is our way out of the “race to the bottom” and is our ticket to a
twenty-first century that maintains an American federal-state stake in the
health and welfare of its citizens.
                                                                                                         
78. 141 CONG. REC. S16,847-48 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995) (quoting David Broder).
79. 141 CONG. REC. S16,848 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995).
80. Kent, State Feasibility, supra note 19, at 1; see H.R. 2491, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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